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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OSHA STANDARDS: THE EFFECT OF
THE RIGHT TO PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW OF
OSHA STANDARDS ON SUBSEQUENT
CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act)' authorizes the Secre-
tary of Labor to promulgate legally enforceable work safety standards.2
Section 61 of the Act sets forth the requisite procedures for promulgating
such standards.' This provision includes a summary procedure5 that
permits6 the Secretary to implement without formal rulemaking proce-
dures national consensus7 and established Federal work safety standards'
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ § 651-678 (1982)). The purpose of the Act is to "assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b) (1982).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1982). Section 17 of the Act provides for both civil
and criminal sanctions for noncompliance with Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) standards. See id § 666.
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1982).
4. Section 6(b) sets forth the rulemaking procedure necessary for the issuance, modi-
fication or revocation of an OSHA standard. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(5) (1982). The
Secretary of Labor must initate the proceeding. He may do so either on his own volition
or on petition from interested parties or recommendation of another government agency.
Id. § 655(b)(1). OSHA may establish an advisory committee to make recommendations
regarding the proposal of standards. Id. § 656(b). Section 7(b) of the Act governs the
personnel for the advisory committee. Id. Timetables for the entire adoption procedure
are contained in § 6(b). Id. § 655(b)(2)-(4). OSHA must publish each proposed standard
and allow thirty days for comment. Id. § 655(b)(2). A hearing must be held if objections
to a proposal are filed and a hearing is requested. Id. § 655(b)(3). OSHA must either
issue the standard or make a determination that the standard should not be issued within
sixty days after the expiration of the comment period or after the hearing date. Id.
§ 655(b)(4). If the standard is adopted, a statement of reasons for that action must be
published. Id. § 655(e). The main institution for recommending such action is the Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, which is the research arm of OSHA.
Id. § 671(a).
OSHA is authorized to issue emergency temporary standards (ETS) pursuant to § 6(c),
if it determines that an ETS is necessary to protect employees from exposure to sub-
stances or agents that are physically harmfuL See id. § 655(c)(1). No rulemaking proce-
dure is necessary for the issuance of an ETS. Id. The ETS takes immediate effect and
remains effective until it is superseded by a permanent standard issued pursuant to § 6(b).
Id. § 655(c)(2). See generally 1 W. Connolly & D. Crowell, A Practical Guide to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act: Law, Principles & Practices 398-99 (1977) (discuss-
ing the requirements for an ETS). A permanent standard must be issued no later than six
months after publication of the ETS. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3) (1982).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982). See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
6. The summary procedure expired two years after the effective date of the Act. See
29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982).
7. The term "national consensus standard" means any occupational safety and
health standard or modification thereof which, (1) has been adopted and
promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing organization
under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that persons
interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have reached
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that existed at the time of the Act's adoption.9 The Secretary established
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to carry out
the safety and health functions of the Act.10 OSHA then promulgated
numerous standards pursuant to the summary procedure. 1
Prior to enforcement of a new OSHA standard and within sixty days
of its publication, any person who will be "adversely affected" by its en-
forcement may, pursuant to section 6(f), petition the court of appeals to
review that standard's substantive and procedural validity. 2 Section 6(f)
is the exclusive vehicle for such pre-enforcement review.13 The Act also
provides in section 10(c)"4 that upon enforcement,"5 citations and penal-
ties for alleged violations may be contested before the Occupational
substantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner which
afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been
designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consultation with other
appropriate Federal agencies.
29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1982).
Two organizations expressly mentioned in the legislative history of the Act as "na-
tional consensus organizations" are the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). B. Mintz, OSHA: History, Law
and Policy 40 & n.20 (1984); see S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 [hereinafter
cited as Senate Report No. 1282], reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5177,
5182, and in Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative
History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 141, 146 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Legislative History].
8. 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1982) defines an established Federal standard as "any opera-
tive occupational safety and health standard established by any agency of the United
States and presently in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on December
29, 1970." Id. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
9. Further rulemaking procedure was deemed unnecessary, see B. Mintz, supra note
7, at 40, because both national consensus standards and established Federal standards as
defined by the Act must have been originally adopted under procedures that ensured that
parties of diverse views were heard. See Senate Report No. 1282, supra note 7, at 6,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5177, 5182, and in Legislative History,
supra note 7, at 146; M. Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law § 51, at 49 (2d
ed. 1983). But see J. Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: An Economic and Political Analysis
of Occupational Safety and Health Policy 36-41 (1979) (criticizing this method of
promulgating standards).
10. See 36 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971). OSHA operates under the auspices of the Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health. See id.
11. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982).
13. RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1984); Senate Report No.
1282, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5177, 5184, and
in Legislative History, supra note 7, at 148.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982).
15. Section 8(a) authorizes the Secretary's inspectors to conduct occupational safety
and health inspections at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(a) (1982). Section 17(f) provides that OSHA may bring criminal charges against
any person who gives unauthorized advance notice of an inspection. See id. § 666(f).
When the Secretary or his authorized representative believes, following the inspection or
investigation, that an employer has violated his duties under the Act, the inspector "shall
with reasonable promptness issue a citation to the employer." Id. § 658(a). The citation
must describe with particularity the nature of the violation. Id.
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Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission). 6 Final orders of
the Commission are subject to review by the court of appeals under sec-
tion 11(a). 7
Although the Commission regularly entertains challenges to the proce-
dural sufficiency of OSHA standards,18 courts disagree as to whether the
Act permits such challenges to be made in enforcement proceedings. 9
16. Section 12(a) of the Act established the Commission to adjudicate proceedings
arising under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § § 651(b)(3), 661(a) (1982). The Commission is
composed of three members appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.
Id. § 661(a). The members must be persons who by reason of training, education or
experience are qualified to carry out the functions of the Commission. Id. The President
designates one of the members as Chairman of the Commission. Id. The Chairman is
responsible for the administration of the Commission, including the appointment of ad-
ministrative law judges and other employees necessary to carry out the Commission's
functions. Id. § 661(b). Official action can be taken only by the affirmative vote of two
members, who constitute a quorum. Id. § 661(f). The Commission is an autonomous,
independent body, free of any control by the Secretary of Labor. See Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Guidebook to Occupational Safety and Health (CCH) 107,
at 13-14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Guidebook]; B. Mintz, supra note 7, at 335; M.
Rothstein, supra note 9, § 351, at 341.
If an employer files notice that it is contesting a citation, the case is transferred to the
Commission for adjudication pursuant to § 10(c). 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982). The case is
then assigned to a Commission administrative law judge who is responsible for all pre-
hearing and hearing matters and the issuance of a decision. Id. § 661(j). The administra-
tive law judge's decision becomes a final order of the Commission 30 days after its
issuance, unless a Commission member directs Commission review of the decision within
that 30-day period. Id. Because of this deadline, the Commission requires parties seek-
ing this discretionary review to fie a petition within 25 days after the decision is issued.
See Guidebook, supra, 637. See generally I W. Connolly & D. Crowel, supra note 4, at
285-304 (discussing procedure for Commission review of citations); M. Rothstein, supra
note 9, §§ 441-453 (same).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1982). Pursuant to this section a party must file a petition
for review within sixty days in the court of appeals for the circuit in which the alleged
violation occurred, or in the circuit in which the aggrieved party has his principal place of
business. See id. Furthermore, no objection that has not been urged before the Commis-
sion will be considered by the court unless failure or neglect to urge an objection is ex-
cused because of extraordinary circumstances. Id.
18. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1092, 1095 (1980); see, eg., S & H
Riggers & Erectors, Inc., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1260, 1260 (1979), rev'd on other grounds,
659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981); Deering Milliken, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2143, 2145
(1978), aft'd, 630 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1980); Kennecott Copper Corp., 4 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1400, 1400 & n.3 (1976), affid, 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977); Noblecraft Indus.,
3 0.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1727, 1730 (1975), vacated in part on other grounds, 614 F.2d 199
(9th Cir. 1980).
19. Compare Madison Foods, Inc. v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 628, 629 n.2 (8th Cir.1980)
(per curiam) (challenges to OSHA regulations based on failure of Secretary to comply
with procedural requirements may be raised only in pre-enforcement proceedings) and
National Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 1978)
(same) with Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 766 F.2d 575, 582-83 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (pre-enforcement review provisions of the Act do not bar petitioner's
subsequent procedural attack) and Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 1094,
1099 (5th Cir. 1980) (same) and Marshall v. Union Oil Co., 616 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
1980) (same) and Noblecraft Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 614 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir.
1980) (same) and Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113, 1116-19 (10th Cir.
1977) (reviewing Commission's decision on a procedural challenge, thereby implicitly
stating that the Commission had authority to make such a ruling). The Fourth Circuit
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Because procedural infirmities are immediately discernible when a stan-
dard is promulgated and therefore can be raised within the sixty-day pre-
enforcement review period, the Eighth Circuit has held that the right to
pre-enforcement review precludes the Commission from hearing proce-
dural challenges in enforcement proceedings.20 Consequently, that court
does not review Commission decisions regarding such challenges.2'
Other circuits, however, have reached the contrary conclusion, reasoning
that the sixty-day period is not sufficient time to mount a successful
challenge.22
This Note contends that the plain language of section 6(f) and its legis-
lative history support the conclusion that the section should not be read
narrowly in precluding review of procedural validity in enforcement pro-
ceedings. In addition, because the Commission promulgated numerous
standards under the summary procedure, many employers who were in-
capable of ascertaining each standard's procedural validity during the
pre-enforcement period will be forever barred from bringing a procedural
challenge unless section 6(f) is interpreted broadly. This Note concludes
that the right to pre-enforcement review does not foreclose an employer
from challenging in an enforcement proceeding the procedural validity of
an OSHA standard.
I. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Section 6(f) provides that "[a]ny person who may be adversely affected
by a standard issued under this section may at any time prior to the
sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated fie a petition challenging
the validity of such standard with the United States court of appeals. '23
The plain meaning of the section does not preclude subsequent review of
standards for procedural infirmities.24 Moreover, the legislative history
of the Act indicates that Congress intended to provide for judicial review
of OSHA standards in both pre-enforcement and enforcement proceed-
has attempted to reconcile this split by permitting an employer who has been prejudiced
by the procedural infirmity to raise the infirmity upon enforcement. See Daniel Int'l
Corp. v. OSHRC, 656 F.2d 925, 928-31 (4th Cir. 1981).
20. See Madison Foods, Inc. v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 628, 629 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); National Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.
1978). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that OSHA's interest in the finality of its standards
and the burden of defending continuous procedural challenges dictate against providing a
perpetual forum in which OSHA's procedural irregularities may be raised. Id. at 1052.
21. See National Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (8th
Cir. 1978).
22. See, ag., Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 766 F.2d 575, 582-83
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir.
1980); Marshall v. Union Oil Co., 616 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1980).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982).
24. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01, at 73-74 (C. Sands
4th rev. ed. 1984) (a provision of an act must be applied according to the customary
purport of its language unless it is shown that some other section of the act expands or
restricts its meaning or it is repugnant to the general purview of the act or the legislative
history implies a different meaning).
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ings.' The Senate Report explains that section 6(f) does not prevent "an
employer from challenging the validity of a standard during an enforce-
ment proceeding.12 6 In fact, Congress rejected a proposal that explicitly
stated that "the [pre-enforcement review] provided by this subsection for
reviewing a standard or rule shall be exclusive."'  Nothing in the Act'
or its legislative history distinguishes between substantive 9 and proce-
dural"0 challenges. In Yakus v. United States3" the Supreme Court con-
25. See RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 300 n.25 (5th Cir. 1984). The intent of
the legislature is the criterion most often used for the interpretation of statutes. 2A N.
Singer, supra note 24, § 45.05, at 20-21. It is assumed that courts have an obligation to
carry out the will of the legislature. See id. § 45.05, at 21. This assumption is mandated
by the principles of separation of powers. See id.
26. Senate Report No. 1282, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5177, 5184, and in Legislative History, supra note 7, at 148. One analysis of S.
2193, which contains § 6(f) as ultimately passed, is that "Djudicial review of standards
would also be possible in enforcement proceedings." Comparative Analysis of Significant
Provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Bill, S. 2193 Reported by the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, and S. 4404, the Substitute Occupational Safety
and Health Bill, reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,725 (1970), and in Legislative History,
supra note 7, at 302, 304.
27. S. 4404, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1970), reprinted in Legislative History, supra
note 7, at 73,111. Statements made during debates clarify that a "standard may also be
challenged during an enforcement proceeding.... On the other hand, the substitute bill
provides for exclusive judicial review within 30 days of the promulgation of a standard,
and forecloses any possibility of obtaining judicial review of a standard in an enforcement
proceeding." 116 Cong. Rec. 37,340 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 7, at 431-32.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § § 655(f), 659(c) (1982). See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying
text.
29. Substantive infirmities generally cannot be detected until employers attempt to
implement a new standard. Substantive defenses include, among others: impossibility of
compliance (employer must show that the standard is functionally impossible or would
preclude performance of required work, and that alternative means of protection are
either in use or unavailable), see M. Rothstein, supra note 9, § 119; greater hazard (em-
ployer must show that compliance creates a greater hazard than noncompliance, that
alternative means of protection are unavailable and that a variance application, which is
granted when an employer practices an alternative safety procedure that does not comply
exactly with the standard but provides a comparable degree of safety, is inappropriate),
see M. Rothstein, supra note 9, § 121; see also Weiner, Variance Under OSHA- An Up-
date, 28 Lab. L. 161, 161 (1977) (discussing availability of variances under the Act);
technological infeasibility (Secretary has burden upon enforcement of showing that spe-
cific, technically feasible means exist to abate the violation), see M. Rothstein, supra note
9, § 122; and economic infeasibility (employer must show that compliance is extremely
costly and that the employer cannot absorb or pass on such cost), see M Rothstein, supra
note 9, § 123. These problems do not arise until an employer makes a good faith effort to
comply with the standard, at which time the pre-enforcement period will most likely have
expired. See National Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC 583 F.2d 1048, 1052 (8th
Cir. 1978) (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 549-50
(3d Cir. 1976)); see also RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1984)
("some issues of validity will not gain sufficient definition before actual enforcement").
30. Procedural irregularities are immediately discernible and "need not await the
test of time."' RSR Corp. v Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Na-
tional Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978)). See
supra notes 4, 20 and accompanying text.
31. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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sidered a challenge32 to a standard promulgated under the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 (EPCA).33 Section 203(a) 34 of the EPCA ex-
plicitly limited challenges made after the expiration of the pre-enforce-
ment period to those "based solely on grounds arising after the expiration
of such sixty days."' 35  This effectively foreclosed all procedural chal-
lenges after the pre-enforcement period.36 In deciding that this section
precluded a challenge to the validity of an EPCA regulation in an en-
forcement proceeding,37 the Court relied on the express language of ex-
clusivity and the clear legislative intent.38  Neither section 6(f) 39 nor
section 10(c)4 of the Act contains equivalent language of exclusivity re-
garding either substantive or procedural challenges.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN FAVOR OF EXPANSIVE REVIEW
Because of the wartime situation, the agency charged with administer-
ing the EPCA4 1 had an overriding interest in the certainty of its regula-
tions and the conservation of its resources.42 The purpose of the EPCA
was to further national defense and security by preventing speculative
and excessive price rises, price dislocations, and inflationary tendencies.43
Congress felt that this was necessary for the effective prosecution of
World War II. 4 In order to protect these strong agency interests in fi-
nality, Congress explicitly provided for limitations on post-enforcement
review.45
Although OSHA has interests in the finality and certainty of its safety
standards and in avoiding the expense of defending these standards
against successive procedural attacks,46 the lack of language of exclusiv-
ity in section 6(f) indicates that Congress did not consider these interests
32. See id. at 418.
33. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (terminated 1947).
34. Ch. 26, § 203(a), 56 Stat. 23, 31 (1942) (terminated 1947).
35. Id.
36. Because procedural infirmities arise during the enactment of a standard, the
grounds for such a challenge arise upon the promulgation of the standard. See supra note
30 and accompanying text.
37. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 430-31 (1944).
38. See id. at 429-30.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982).
40. See id. § 659(c).
41. Ch. 26, § 201(a), 56 Stat. 23, 29 (1942) (terminated 1947).
42. See The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 1, 56 Stat. 23, 23-24
(purpose clause) (terminated 1947); S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942).
43. Ch. 26, § 1, 56 Stat. 23, 23-24 (1942) (purpose clause) (terminated 1947).
44. See id. The price control regulations were also needed to prevent excessive dis-
ruption to the economy from abnormal market conditions and profiteering. See Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 431-32 (1944); S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3
(1942).
45. See The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 203(a), 56 Stat. 23, 31
(terminated 1947); S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 22 (1942).
46. See RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1984); National
Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978). The Fifth
Circuit refused to review the substantive or procedural challenges made by an employer
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to be overriding. 47 Moreover, the statutory framework of the Act neces-
sitates expanded judicial review. Although the Eighth Circuit has held
that the sixty-day period for pre-enforcement judicial review of standards
provided for in section 6(f) is sufficient for procedural challenges,48 re-
striction on subsequent review would impose undue hardship on parties
without the funds or political acumen to raise a challenge within sixty
days of the promulgation of a standard.49 It "is totally unrealistic to
assume that more than a fraction of the persons and entities affected by a
regulation-especially small [employers] scattered across the country-
would have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access
to the Federal Register.""0
This point is best illustrated by the adoption of standards under sec-
tion 6(a)'s summary procedure."1 The procedure was intended to enable
OSHA to establish without delay minimum standards of health and
safety for the nation's workforce.5 2 On May 29, 1971, OSHA adopted a
large body of national consensus and federal safety standards as OSHA
safety standards.5 3 This hasty and wholesale procedure, which produced
two hundred fifty pages of regulations in the Federal Register,' gener-
ated much criticism."5 This extreme case exemplifies how burdensome it
who had participated in the rulemaking process and had no excuse for failing to assert the
challenges within the pre-enforcement review period. See RSR Corp., 747 F.2d at 302.
47. Courts should not read words of exclusivity into a statute when its meaning is
plain. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 24, § 47.38, at 265. See supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text
48. See Madison Foods, Inc. v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 628, 629 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); National Indus. Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.
1978). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
49. See 116 Cong. Rec. 37,340 (1971), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 7,
at 431 (statement of Sen. Williams in response to Senate bill proposing exclusive review)
(practical effect of exclusive review would be to deny small employers and companies
their day in court).
50. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. See Senate Report No. 1282, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5177, 5182, and in Legislative History, supra note 7, at 146.
53. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1971) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § § 1910.1-.1500 (1985)).
54. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10,466-10,714 (1971).
55. See J. Mendeloff, supra note 9, at 39-41; Moran, Cite OSHA for Violations, Occu-
pational Safety and Health, Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 19-20, reprinted in B. Mintz, supra note
7, at 43-44. Mr. Moran explains that many of these standards were not sufficiently spe-
cific for an ordinary employer to understand and implement them. See Moran, supra at
20, reprinted in B. Mintz, supra note 7, at 44. Other standards were irrelevant to work-
place safety and health. See Moran, supra, at 20, reprinted in B. Mintz, supra note 7, at
44. Moreover, these standards were not subject to close scrutiny when they were first
written. The national consensus standards had originally been developed as advisory
standards and as such incorporated some lofty goals. See Moran, supra, at 20, reprinted
in B. Mintz, supra note 7, at 44. The underlying laws from which the established Federal
standards were adopted applied to a relatively small number of the employers now sub-
ject to them pursuant to the Act. See Moran, supra, at 20, reprinted in B. Mintz, supra
note 7, at 44. At the time these standards were originally presented for public scrutiny,
the vast majority of employers were not aware that they would eventually be subject to
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is to comb through all OSHA standards and raise procedural objections
within the pre-enforcement period. 6 Although OSHA has an interest in
the finality of its standards and the conservation of its funds, denial of
subsequent procedural challenges would impose an unfair burden on
employers.
CONCLUSION
The right to pre-enforcement review afforded by section 6(f) does not
foreclose subsequent procedural challenges. The language of the Act,
coupled with the legislative intent, supports such a conclusion. More-
over, in light of the summary procedure for adopting standards, it is in-
appropriate to preclude procedural challenges for the many employers
who were unable to detect a standard's procedural infirmities during the
pre-enforcement period. It is also unreasonable to assume that all those
affected by a newly promulgated standard will become aware of its adop-
tion within sixty days. Employers must therefore be able to raise proce-
dural challenges during enforcement proceedings. The Commission has
properly held that it has authority to rule on the procedural validity of
OSHA standards in enforcement proceedings, and courts should there-
fore review such decisions.
Thomas J. Ryan
them and were thus effectively denied a chance to comment. See Moran, supra, at 20,
reprinted in B. Mintz, supra note 7, at 44.
56. See RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1984); Deering Milli-
ken, Inc. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Union Oil Co., 616
F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 6(f) should be construed to harmonize with all
other sections of the Act. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 24, § 47.06 (the separate effect of
each individual section of an act must be interpreted so as to make it consistent with the
whole). Expansive review under this section therefore seems necessary in light of the
summary procedure for promulgating standards contained in § 6(a). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(a) (1982). See supra notes 4, 53-55 and accompanying text. Moreover, the provi-
sions of § 6(f) should be construed to encompass situations that were contemplated by
the legislature. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 24, § 54.05, at 571. See supra notes 28-30
and accompanying text.
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